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THE LAGRAND DECISION: THE EVOLVING
LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS IN
U.S. DEATH PENALTY CASES
Howard S. Schiffman*
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 27, 2001, the International Court of Justice
("ICJ") issued its long-awaited decision in the LaGrand case
between Germany and the United States.' LaGrand was a
United States death penalty case that became a dispute of in-
ternational magnitude. As such, its legacy will affect future
death penalty cases in both domestic and international law
where the rights of the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions ("VCCR") are applicable.2 The death penalty is a matter
of increasing concern in international law and policy, and the
application of the VCCR is a significant point of contention in
that general debate.
The LaGrand brothers were German nationals who were
tried, convicted and executed in the United States without be-
ing advised of their right to contact German consular authori-
* Adjunct Assistant Professor, New York University School of Continuing
and Professional Studies. Former staff attorney, Legal Aid Society of New York,
Criminal Defense Division. LL.M. (International and Comparative Law), The
George Washington University Law School; J.D., Suffolk University Law
School; B.A., Boston University.
1. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), Final Judgment (June 27, 2001),
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm [hereinafter Final
Judgment].
2. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCRI. The VCCR is a multilateral treaty pro-
viding principally for the rights and responsibilities of consular personnel in the
discharge of their official duties. The key right provided for by the VCCR, and
the one most salient to LaGrand, is Article 36 entitled, "Communication and
Contact with Nationals of the Sending State." Id. art. 36. For the full text of
Article 36, see infra text accompanying note 6.
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ties.3 The ICJ's clear endorsement of the important rights of
consular notification and access for detained foreign nationals
embodied in the VCCR, and its equally clear rebuke of the
United States for its disregard of those rights in a death pen-
alty case, has changed the legal landscape of the application
of the VCCR in the United States.
Most significantly, U.S. disregard of the Order of Provi-
sional Measures not to execute Walter LaGrand pending the
ICJ's determination of the international law issues will nec-
essarily bring about changes in the way VCCR issues will be
addressed in the United States. This article examines some
of the key features of the LaGrand decision and its potential
impact on U.S. law and policy, both at the national and
international levels.
3. Final Judgment, supra note 1, 1 13. The facts of LaGrand are relatively
straightforward. Walter and Karl LaGrand were brothers of German national-
ity. See id. In 1982, they were both arrested in Arizona and charged with bank
robbery, murder, and kidnapping in an Arizona state court. See id. 14. In
1984, they were convicted for those crimes and sentenced to death. See id. It is
not disputed that at the time the LaGrands were convicted and sentenced, the
U.S. authorities had not informed them of their right to seek assistance from
the German consular authorities or informed the relevant German consular
post of the LaGrands' arrest. See id. 91 15. This omission, admitted by the
United States, was in violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
See VCCR, infra note 2. The matter of the VCCR violation was not raised by
the LaGrands during their trial or subsequent appeals. Final Judgment, supra
note 1, TT 17-21. Germany first learned of the LaGrands' detention in 1992.
See id. 15. In 1995, upon federal habeas corpus review, the LaGrands raised
the matter of the VCCR violation for the first time. See id. 91 23. This claim was
rejected on the basis of the "procedural default" rule. See id. On February 24,
1999, Karl LaGrand was executed. See id. T1 29. On March 2, 1999, the day be-
fore the scheduled execution date of Walter LaGrand, Germany brought an ap-
plication against the United States in the ICJ requesting an order of provisional
measures suspending Walter LaGrand's execution pending a ruling by the ICJ
on the matter of the breach of the VCCR. See id. 91 30. On March 3, 1999, the
ICJ issued that provisional order against the U.S. See id. 91 32. Despite the
ICJ's order of provisional measures, Walter LaGrand was executed that same
day. See id. 91 34. For the procedural history of the LaGrands' trial, appeals
and habeas corpus review in U.S. courts, see Stewart v. LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115
(1999). In a parallel proceeding to Walter LaGrand's habeas corpus petition,
the German government sought to enforce the ICJ's order of provisional meas-
ures to delay Walter LaGrand's execution. See Federal Republic of Germany v.
United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999).
4. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9 (Mar. 3) (Request for
the Indication of Provisional Measures) [hereinafter LaGrand Order]; Final
Judgment, supra note 1, 9191 32-34 (stating that the U.S. proceedings leading to
the execution of Walter LaGrand continued despite the ICJ request).
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II. INVOKING ARTICLE 36 OF THE VCCR
A. Article 36 of the VCCR
An understanding of the applicable provision of the
VCCR is the appropriate point of departure to appreciate the
significance of LaGrand and other cases that raise the same
issue of international law-that is, the right of detained for-
eign nationals to have access to their consular personnel in
the country where they are detained. This right is provided
for in Article 36 of the VCCR.5 Article 36 provides as follows:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular
functions relating to nationals of the sending State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate
with nationals of the sending State and to have ac-
cess to them. Nationals of the sending state shall
have the same freedom with respect to communica-
tion with and access to consular officers of the send-
ing State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the
receiving State shall, without delay, inform the con-
sular post of the sending State if, within its consular
district, a national of that State is arrested or com-
mitted to prison or to custody pending trial or is de-
tained in any other manner. Any communication ad-
dressed to the consular post by the person arrested,
in prison, custody or detention shall also be for-
warded by the said authorities without delay. The
said authorities shall inform the person concerned
without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a na-
tional of the sending State who is in prison, custody
or detention, to converse and correspond with him
and to arrange for his legal representation. They
shall also have the right to visit any national of the
sending State who is in prison, custody or detention
in their district pursuance of a judgment. Neverthe-
less, consular officers shall refrain from taking action
on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or de-
tention if he expressly opposes such action.
5. VCCR, supra note 3, art. 36.
110120021
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2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article
shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regula-
tions of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, how-
ever, that the said laws and regulations must enable full
effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights ac-
corded under this Article are intended. 6
The text of Article 36 itself presents important questions
of interpretation for U.S. courts. For example, does it create
rights directly available to a criminal defendant or does it
only concern the powers of consular personnel and thus the
rights of governments? This question, often posed in terms of
whether the VCCR is a "self-executing treaty," is the subject
of considerable scholarly and juristic debate.7 Although rele-
vant to LaGrand, neither the VCCR's status as a source of
law in the United States nor the general importance of consu-
lar notification and access will be considered in great detail in
this article. Instead, this article will focus upon the contours
of the LaGrand decision and its potential to influence law and
policy in the future, particularly in relation to other death
penalty cases.
B. Other U.S. Death Penalty Cases Invoking Article 36 of the
VCCR
Because LaGrand resulted in a final judgment on the
merits by the ICJ, it is perhaps the most visible dispute gen-
erated by Article 36. However, it was by no means the only
one. The road to LaGrand is paved with other similar cases
6. Id. (emphasis added). For an excellent source discussing consular func-
tions in international law, including access to foreign nationals, see LUKE T.
LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1991). For a discussion of the law
and practice of consular notification and access specifically with regard to
criminal justice, see Victor M. Uribe, Consuls at Work: Universal Instruments of
Human Rights and Consular Protection in the Context of Criminal Justice, 19
Hous. J. INT'L L. 375 (1997).
7. See Howard S. Schiffman, Breard and Beyond: The Status of Consular
Notification and Access Under the Vienna Convention, 8 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 27, 33-42 (2000) (examining arguments for and against self-execution);
Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A
Search for the Right to Consul, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 565 (1997) (arguing that the
VCCR is a self-executing treaty). For more general scholarly discussions of the
doctrine of self-executing treaties, see Carlos Manuel Vdsquez, The Four Doc-
trines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995); Thomas Buer-
genthal, Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties in National and Inter-
national Law, 235 RECUIL DES COURS 303 (1992 IV); Jordan J. Paust, Self-
Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988).
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where other foreign governments protested the violation of
Article 36 in regard to their nationals. Despite the emphasis
on death penalty cases, Article 36 applies to any detained for-
eign national where both the detaining state and the state of
nationality of the detainee are parties to the VCCR. Most of
the debate about the application of the VCCR, however, has
occurred in cases factually similar to LaGrand, specifically,
where the foreign governments protested impending death
sentences imposed against their nationals following violations
of Article 36.
In the 1998 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(Paraguay v. U.S.) ("Breard") case, Paraguay brought an ap-
plication before the ICJ against the United States alleging a
similar violation of the VCCR.8 Angel Francisco Breard was
tried, convicted and sentenced to death in the Commonwealth
of Virginia.9 As in LaGrand, the ICJ issued a provisional or-
der to the United States to take all measures at its disposal to
see that Breard was not executed pending the final outcome
of the ICJ proceedings.' ° Breard was executed while the order
was outstanding." Unlike LaGrand, however, Paraguay, the
complaining state, requested withdrawal of its case from the
docket of the ICJ after Breard's execution." In the case of Jo-
seph Stanley Faulder, the State of Texas executed Mr.
Faulder, a Canadian national, despite the fact that he was
not advised of his right to confer with Canadian consular au-
thorities. ' In another significant death penalty case, which is
8. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Application of
the Republic of Paraguay (Apr. 3, 1998), at http://www.icj-
cij.orglicjwww/idocketipaus/ipausframe.htm [hereinafter Breard Application].
For a complete discussion of Breard and an earlier analysis of the VCCR in law
and policy, see Schiffman, supra note 7.
9. See Breard Application, supra note 8, 5-11. Breard was convicted in
Virginia state court of attempted rape and murder. See Breard v. Greene, 523
U.S. 371, 373 (1998). He raised the matter of the VCCR violation for the first
time at federal habeas corpus review. Id. at 375-76. The U.S. Supreme Court
rejected the claim as having been "procedurally defaulted" (not raised in state
court), and because it was not likely to have affected the outcome of the case.
Id. at 375, 377.
10. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998
I.C.J. 248 (April 9) (Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures).
11. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Press
Communiqud 98/36 (Nov. 11, 1998). Breard was executed on April 14, 1998. Id.
12. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998
I.C.J. 426, 427 (Nov. 9) (Discontinuance).
13. See Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1996). Faulder was tried
110320021
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still pending at the time of this writing, the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals is reviewing the sentence of Gerardo
Valdez, a Mexican national convicted following a VCCR viola-
tion.'
4
Although these are the most often discussed cases, U.S.
courts have addressed similar violations of Article 36 of the
VCCR in both capital and non-capital cases." At a minimum,
these cases all highlight the tension between U.S. law and
and convicted in Texas state court for robbery and murder. Id. at 517. His con-
viction was reversed on appeal but he was again convicted at retrial. See id.
Like the LaGrands, Faulder raised the VCCR issue upon federal habeas corpus
petition. Id. at 520. The Fifth Circuit rejected his petition, holding that there
was no indication that the Canadian authorities could have done any more for
Mr. Faulder than his U.S. attorneys. See id.
14. See Valdez v. State, No. PCD-2001-1011 (Okla. Crim. App. filed Aug. 22,
2001). Valdez was convicted in Oklahoma state court of first-degree murder
and sentenced to death in 1990; his conviction was upheld upon appeal to the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. See Valdez v. State, 1995 OK CR 18, 900
P.2d 363, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 967 (1995). The Oklahoma court denied his first
petition for post-conviction relief. See Valdez v. State, 1997 OK CR 12, 933 P.2d
931. The Tenth Circuit upheld the denial of his federal petition for habeas cor-
pus. See Valdez v. Ward, 219 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom.,
Valdez v. Gibson, 532 U.S. 979 (2001). The latest petition for post-conviction
relief in the Valdez case was filed on August 22, 2001. This subsequent petition
was motivated, in part, by the ICJ's LaGrand decision and the intervention of
the Mexican government on behalf of Mr. Valdez. See Second Application for
Post-Conviction Relief, Valdez v. State, Valdez (No. PCD-2001-1011). Even be-
fore the Mexican government intervened in Valdez's case, Mexico's great con-
cern for VCCR rights, particularly in the context of the death penalty, moti-
vated it to seek an advisory opinion before the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights declaring the importance of Article 36 rights. See The Right to Informa-
tion on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due
Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Oct. 1, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. A) No. 16 [hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-16/991. In the advisory opin-
ion the Inter-American Court stated "that the individual right under analysis
must be recognized and counted among the minimum guarantees essential to
providing foreign nationals the opportunity to adequately prepare their defense
and receive a fair trial." Id. 122.
15. For examples of other notable U.S. cases where violations of the VCCR
were litigated in federal courts, see United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56 (1st Cir.
2000); Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2000) (capital case); United
States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Ademaj, 170 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Cordoba-Mosquera, 212
F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 1998). For two key state supreme court cases where the
VCCR issue was litigated, see People v. Madej, 739 N.E.2d. 423 (Ill. 2000) (capi-
tal case); Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134 (Iowa 2001). For a Web site that
tracks Article 36 violations in the U.S criminal justice system with an emphasis
on capital cases, see Death Penalty Information Center at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
foreignnatl.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2002).
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practice with regard to the VCCR on the one hand, and U.S.
obligations under the treaty and international law on the
other. The LaGrand case is unique in that it gave rise to a
decisive litigation over U.S. actions with respect to the VCCR
on the international plane.
III. LAW AND FACTS OF THE LAGRAND CASE IN U.S. COURTS
The facts of the LaGrands' alleged crimes, trial, convic-
tion and sentence are unremarkable from the standpoint of
U.S. law. From the perspective of international law, however,
the odyssey of the LaGrand brothers is problematic and con-
troversial. The hallmark of the LaGrands' case, like so many
other VCCR cases, is that at no time during their detention
were the LaGrand brothers ever advised of their right to con-
tact German consular officials for assistance, nor were Ger-
man authorities notified of their detention. 6 This fact is not
in dispute as the United States admitted to the VCCR viola-
tion.'7 Nevertheless, LaGrand raises important issues of in-
ternational law that need to be understood. In particular,
LaGrand will long be remembered for its contribution to the
status of provisional measures in the jurisprudence of the
ICJ.
Although there was no dispute that the United States
had failed to comply with the VCCR, there was a question as
to when U.S. authorities became aware of the fact that the
LaGrands were German nationals." Germany contended that
U.S. authorities knew very early in their case. 9 The United
States, on the other hand, asserted that they did not know of
their German nationality until one to two years after their
arrest.0 The German government did not become aware of
16. Final Judgment, supra note 1, T 15.
17. See id. For a review of the U.S. positions in the ICJ in LaGrand, see
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 95
AM. J. INT'L L. 650-55 (Sean D. Murphy ed., 2001) [hereinafter Contemporary
Practice]. The fact that the LaGrands were not advised of their rights under the
VCCR was not contested in the U.S. courts either. See infra note 25.
18. See Final Judgment, supra note 1, 16.
19. See id.
20. See id. The United States argued that at the time of their arrest neither
Karl nor Walter LaGrand identified themselves as German nationals. See id.
The United States also suggested that at the time of their arrest, the LaGrands
themselves may not have known that they were not U.S. nationals. See id.
Walter and Karl were born in Germany in 1962 and 1963 respectively. Id. 13.
They moved to the United States in 1967 with their mother when they were still
110520021
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their case until the LaGrands notified them in 1992.1
A. Procedural Default Bars VCCR Issue from Habeas
Corpus Review
One of the most salient facts in the case was that neither
LaGrand brother ever raised the matter of the VCCR issue at
trial or on appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court in 1989."
Similarly, the VCCR issue was not raised when the U.S. Su-
preme Court denied certiorari to review the cases in 1987 and
1991.23 The LaGrands raised the VCCR issue for the first
time in unsuccessful federal habeas corpus petitions to set
aside their death sentences. 4 The habeas petitions with re-
gard to the VCCR issue were denied because they were "pro-
cedurally defaulted"-that is, they were not raised at the
state court level. 5 In barring the VCCR claim by application
of the procedural default rule, the Ninth Circuit held that the
LaGrands had not shown an objective external factor that
prevented them from raising the issue of the lack of consular
notification at an earlier time in their cases. 5
young children. See id. Apparently neither spoke German, and "they appeared
in all respects to be native citizens of the United States." See id.
21. See id. T 22.
22. See id. 91 21. See also State v. Karl LaGrand, 733 P.2d 1066 (Ariz. 1987);
State v. Walter LaGrand, 734 P.2d 563 (Ariz. 1987).
23. See Final Judgment, supra note 1, 9 21. The U.S. Supreme Court de-
clined to review the state court conviction when it denied certiorari in 1987. See
LaGrand v. Arizona, 484 U.S. 872 (1987). The LaGrands then attempted un-
successfully to challenge their convictions through post-conviction relief peti-
tions in state court. Here again, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. See
LaGrand v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 1259, 1277 (1991).
24. Final Judgment, supra note 1, 9 23. See also LaGrand v. Lewis, 883 F.
Supp. 451 (D. Ariz. 1995); LaGrand v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 469 (D. Ariz. 1995),
affid sub nom, LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1998). The right to
bring a writ of habeas corpus is an ancient common law remedy that has long
been applied in U.S. law. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that the writ of
habeas corpus is "the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual free-
dom against arbitrary and lawless state action." Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286,
290-91 (1969). The right to challenge incarceration from a state criminal con-
viction by federal habeas corpus is codified by federal statute. See 28 U.S.C. §§
2241-2266 (2000). The majority of the LaGrands' federal habeas claims were
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
25. See Final Judgment, supra note 1, 9 23. See also LaGrand v. Stewart,
133 F.3d at 1261. "It is undisputed that the State of Arizona did not notify the
LaGrands of their rights under the [VCCR]. It is also undisputed that this
claim was not raised in any state proceeding. The claim is thus procedurally
defaulted." Id.
26. See Final Judgment, supra note 1, T1 23. See also LaGrand v. Stewart,
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The procedural default rule has long been applied in fed-
eral court to deny habeas corpus petitions and derives from
both statutory,7 and case law.28 Procedural default has been
used to bar consideration of the VCCR issue in other federal
habeas cases. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the applica-
tion of procedural default in Breard v. Greene.29 In Breard,
the Supreme Court held,
It is clear that Breard procedurally defaulted his claim,
if any, under the Vienna Convention by failing to raise
that claim in state courts....
... It is the rule in this country that assertions of error
in criminal proceedings must first be raised in state courts
in order to form the basis for relief in habeas. Claims not
so raised are considered defaulted .
The use of the procedural default rule to bar review of
new matters in death penalty cases is by no means limited to
the VCCR issue.3 The application of the U.S. law of proce-
dural default in the LaGrands' cases, however, would prove
highly significant in the judgment of the ICJ.
B. An Application to the International Court of Justice
Following the failure of the federal habeas petitions,
Germany attempted various unsuccessful political interven-
tions seeking to prevent the LaGrands' executions.32 On Feb-
133 F.3d at 1261.
27. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1214-26 (1996) [hereinafter AEDPA].
28. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
29. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998). For an analysis of the proce-
dural default rule as applied in Breard, see Schiffman, supra note 7, at 47-48.
See also Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Interna-
tionalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 533-34 (1999).
30. Breard, 523 U.S. at 375 (citation omitted).
31. See generally John H. Blume & P.A. Wilkins, Death by Default: State
Procedural Default Doctrine in Capital Cases, 50 S.C. L. REV. 1 (1998).
32. See Final Judgment, supra note 1, 26. In particular, the German For-
eign Minister and German Minister of Justice wrote to their respective United
States counterparts on January 27, 1999. See id. On that same day the Ger-
man Foreign Minister wrote to the Governor of Arizona. See id. On February 2,
1999, the German Chancellor wrote to the President of the United States and
the Governor of Arizona. See id. On February 5, 1999, the President of Ger-
many wrote to the President of the United States. See id. These letters referred
11072002]
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ruary 24, 1999, when last-minute federal court proceedings
on behalf of Karl LaGrand proved to be fruitless, Karl La-
Grand was executed.33 On March 2, 1999, the day before Wal-
ter LaGrand was scheduled to be executed, Germany filed an
application in the ICJ regarding the U.S. violation of the
VCCR.34 Germany simultaneously requested an order of pro-
visional measures against the United States to delay Walter's
execution pending a final determination by the ICJ of the in-
ternational law issues.35 On the same day the matter was
filed in the ICJ, the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency
granted a sixty-day reprieve in light of Germany's case before
the ICJ; however, the Governor of Arizona, Jane Dee Hull,
decided to allow Walter LaGrand's execution to go forward as
scheduled. 6
C. The ICJ Order of Provisional Measures to Delay Walter
LaGrand's Execution
The power to grant provisional measures while a case is
pending before the ICJ is granted to the court in Article 41 of
to German opposition of the death penalty generally, but did not raise the issue
of the absence of consular notification. See id.
33. See id. $ 29. On February 24, 1999, the Ninth Circuit denied all further
claims as to Karl LaGrand and specifically held that the VCCR issue had been
rejected in his previous habeas petition. See LaGrand v. Stewart, 170 F.3d
1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 1999).
34. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), Application Instituting Proceedings
(Mar. 2, 1999), http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm [here-
inafter LaGrand Application]. In its application, Germany predicated the ICJ's
jurisdiction over the United States upon the Optional Protocol to the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of
Disputes. See id. 1 11-13; Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Con-
sular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24,
1964, 23 U.S.T. 3374 [hereinafter Optional Protocol]. It is fundamental to the
jurisprudence of the ICJ that it only has jurisdiction over states that have mani-
fested their consent to appear before the Court, and the means by which such
consent may be manifested is found in Article 36 of the ICJ Statute. See
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 36. Both the United
States and Germany are signatories to the Optional Protocol. In Breard, Para-
guay pleaded jurisdiction over the United States based upon the Optional Pro-
tocol as well. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.),
Press Communiqu6 98/13 (Apr. 3, 1998). For a review of Article 36 of the ICJ
Statute and a general discussion of the contentious jurisdiction of the ICJ, see
JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 132-155 (1999).
35. See LaGrand Application, supra note 34, 91 17.
36. See Final Judgment, supra note 1, 31.
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the ICJ Statute. 7 Article 41 provides as follows:
1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it consid-
ers that the circumstances so require, any provisional
measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respec-
tive rights of either party.
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures sug-
gested shall forthwith be given to the parties and to the
Security Council.38
An order of provisional measures is an interim order di-
rected to a party in litigation before the ICJ to preserve the
rights of the parties while the litigation is pending.39 As such,
it is functionally similar to the equitable power of injunction
in common law courts.
On March 3, 1999, the ICJ, finding the impending execu-
tion of Walter LaGrand a matter of the greatest urgency,
granted Germany's application for provisional measures and
issued the following order ("Order"):
(a) The United States of America should take all measures
at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not exe-
cuted pending the final decision in these proceedings, and
should inform the Court of all the measures which it has
taken in implementation of this Order;
(b) The Government of the United States of America
should transmit this Order to the Governor of the State of
Arizona.4°
37. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 41. The
ICJ Statute forms an integral part of the United Nations Charter. See U.N.
CHARTER art. 92. The U.N. Charter is the organizing document of the United
Nations.
38. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 41.
39. See J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 129 (3d ed.
1998); COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 34, at 168-74. For additional scholarly
analysis of the ICJ's power and use of provisional measures, see Bernard H.
Oxman, Jurisdiction and the Power to Indicate Provisional Measures, THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 323 (Lori F. Damrosch
ed., 1987); Peter J. Goldsworthy, Interim Measures of Protection in the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 258 (1974). For an article that specifi-
cally examines the ICJ's order of provisional measures in Breard, see Louis
Henkin, AGORA: Breard, Provisional Measures, U.S. Treaty Obligations and
the States, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 679 (1998). It is extremely important to note,
however, that these sources were written before the ICJ decided LaGrand.
40. LaGrand Order, supra note 4. The ICJ's Order was unanimous with
President Schwebel appending a separate opinion and Judge Oda appending a
declaration. See id. It is noteworthy that the Order was issued ex parte. The
U.S. Supreme Court noted this factor when it decided not to enforce the ICJ's
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Obtaining this Order of provisional measures in the ICJ
against the United States and the State of Arizona to delay
the execution may have seemed like a momentary victory for
Walter LaGrand. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, was not
persuaded.
D. The U.S. Supreme Court Hears Germany's Plea Based
Upon the ICJ's Order
On the same day the ICJ issued the interim Order
against the United States, Germany brought an action in the
U.S. Supreme Court against both the United States and the
State of Arizona seeking to enforce it.41 Germany sought a
preliminary injunction ordering the U.S. Government and
Governor Hull to prevent Walter LaGrand's execution pursu-
ant to the ICJ Order.42 In a per curiam opinion in Federal
Republic of Germany v. United States. ("F.R.G. v. U.S."), the
Supreme Court declined to do so for two reasons. First, the
United States had not waived its sovereign immunity.43 Sec-
ond, Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution did not
provide an anchor for an action to prevent an execution of a
foreign national who is not an ambassador or consul.44 With
respect to the action against Arizona, the Court found, as it
did in Breard,45 that there is no support in the VCCR for the
ability of a foreign government to assert a claim against a
U.S. state,46 and that such an action is probably a violation of
Order. See infra text accompanying note 48.
41. Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999) (per
curiam). To bring this case in the U.S. Supreme Court, Germany relied upon
the Court's original jurisdiction established by Article III, Section 2 of the U.S.
Constitution. Id. Article III, Section 2 provides, "In all Cases affecting Ambas-
sadors, other public ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be
a party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction...." U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
42. See Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. at 111.
43. See id. at 112. For a key case discussing the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity in U.S. law, see Principality of Monaco v. Miss., 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
For a discussion of sovereign immunity as it applies to VCCR litigation in U.S.
courts, see Schiffman, supra note 7, at 49-50.
44. See Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. at 112. For
the relevant text of Article III, § 2, see supra note 41.
45. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377 (1998) (illustrating how the
U.S. Supreme Court similarly rejected an application to enforce the ICJ's provi-
sional order.) See infra note 113.
46. See Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. at 112.
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the Eleventh Amendment.47 Finally, the Court noted unfa-
vorably that Germany brought its action to the attention of
the ICJ ex parte and within only two hours of the scheduled
execution.48 Accordingly, the Supreme Court declined to exer-
cise its original jurisdiction.49 On that same day, March 3,
1999, Walter LaGrand was executed."
At the time the Supreme Court decided F.R.G. v. U.S., it
was far from settled whether or not an order of provisional
measures by the ICJ established binding obligations for the
state against which it was issued." The concurring52 and dis-
senting53 opinions in F.R.G. v. U.S. reflect this uncertainty
and the rather clear position of the U.S. government on the
matter. In F.R.G. v. U.S., the Solicitor General of the United
States forcefully argued the U.S. position that provisional or-
ders of the ICJ do not establish binding obligations.54
47. See id. The Eleventh Amendment provides, "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of an-
other State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
48. See Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. at 112. In
addition to being an issue before the Supreme Court, the United States raised
the issue of the ex parte nature of the ICJ Order during the merits phase of the
ICJ proceedings. See Final Judgment, supra note 1, 9 55. Specifically, the
United States argued that Germany's late filing of its request for provisional
measures compelled the ICJ to respond without full information. See id. The
U.S. judge on the ICJ, Thomas Buergenthal, specifically noted Germany's late
application to the ICJ in his dissenting opinion. See id. (Buergenthal, J., dis-
senting as to the admissibility of Germany's third submission-the question of
disregard by the United States of its legal obligation to comply with an order
indicating provisional measures). For the relevant text of Germany's third
submission, see infra note 57.
49. See Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. at 112. Al-
though unrelated to the VCCR issue, in a parallel decision, the Supreme Court
ruled Walter LaGrand could not contest the constitutionality of death by lethal
injection. See Stewart v. LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115 (1998).
50. See Final Judgment, supra note 1, 91 34.
51. See Contemporary Practice, supra note 17, at 652-55. For a review of
literature discussing the power of provisional measures pre-dating LaGrand,
see sources cited supra note 39.
52. See Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. at 112.
(Souter, J., concurring) (Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Souter in concurrence).
53. See Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. at 112
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (Justice Stevens joined Justice Breyer in dissent).
54. See id.
The Solicitor General has filed a letter in which he opposes any stay.
In his view, the "Vienna Convention does not furnish a basis for this
Court to grant a stay of execution," and "an order of the [ICJ] indicat-
ing provisional measures is not binding and does not furnish a basis for
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The ultimate holding of the ICJ on this matter notwith-
standing, it is fairly clear that at the time the U.S. Supreme
Court decided F.R.G. v. U.S., the unilateral interpretation of
the U.S. government concerning the effect of provisional
measures by the ICJ weighed heavily in the Court's decision.
The way in which the executive branch of the U.S. govern-
ment, and a U.S. court might view a similar order in the fu-
ture will be discussed in Section V(B). In the meantime, how-
ever, it is first necessary to fully understand the ICJ's final
judgment in LaGrand.
IV. THE ICJ DECISION IN THE LAGRAND CASE
On June 27, 2001, the ICJ issued its decision in La-
Grand.5" In what can only be described as a thorough rebuke
of United States practice under the VCCR, the ICJ's decision
on the merits addressed a number of key issues. First, the
court addressed the disregard by the United States of various
obligations under the VCCR, most notably Articles 36(1) and
36(2).56 Next, the ICJ addressed the United States violation
of its order of provisional measures and whether such orders
create binding obligations in international law.7 Finally, the
judicial relief." The Solicitor General adds, however, that he has "not
had time to read the materials thoroughly or to digest its contents."
Id. at 113 (referring to a letter from Solicitor General Waxman filed Mar. 3,
1999 with Clerk of the Supreme Court). The concurring opinion of Justice
Souter also relies heavily on the position of the Solicitor General. See id. at 112.
I join in the foregoing order, subject to the qualification that I do not
rest my decision to deny leave to file the bill of complaint on any Elev-
enth Amendment principle. In exercising my discretion, I have taken
into consideration the position of the Solicitor General on behalf of the
United States.
Id. The ICJ highlighted the position of the Solicitor General in its recitation of
facts in LaGrand. See Final Judgment, supra note 1, 33.
55. All fifteen judges of the ICJ participated in the proceedings and contrib-
uted to the opinion. They were Judges Guillaume (President), Shi (Vice-
President), Oda, Bedjaoui, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma,
Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh and
Buergenthal. See Final Judgment, supra note 1.
56. See id. T9 65-78. Germany's first and second submissions to the ICJ
dealt with U.S. violations of VCCR Articles 36(1) and 36(2), respectively. See id.
For the full text of Article 36, see supra text accompanying note 6.
57. See Final Judgment, supra note 1, 919 92-116. Germany's third submis-
sion asked the ICJ to adjudge and declare
"that the United States, by failing to take all measures at its disposal
to ensure that Walter LaGrand was not executed pending the final de-
cision of the [ICJ] on the matter, violated its international legal obliga-
tion to comply with the Order on Provisional Measures issued by the
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ICJ addressed what action the United States should take to
prevent future violations of the VCCR and to provide redress
for existing violations-especially with regard to death pen-
alty cases.58
A. The Violation of Article 36
As noted previously, there was no genuine question of
fact as to whether the United States actually violated Article
36.59 Despite this, the ICJ considered whether it was neces-
sary to find that the outcome of the LaGrands' criminal cases
was actually impacted by the United States noncompliance in
order to find a treaty violation, and whether the violation ap-
plied to the LaGrands as individuals and not just Germany as
a nation-state.6 ' The ICJ determined that the United States
violated its obligations under Article 36 regardless of whether
the LaGrands were actually prejudiced, or otherwise affected,
by the breach."' The court held,
It is immaterial for the purposes of the present case
whether the LaGrands would have sought consular assis-
tance from Germany, whether Germany would have ren-
Court on 3 March 1999, and to refrain from any action which might in-
terfere with the subject matter of a dispute while judicial proceedings
are pending."
Id. 92.
58. See id. 9 117-27. Germany's fourth submission asked the ICJ to ad-
judge and declare
"that the United States shall provide Germany an assurance that it
will not repeat its unlawful acts and that, in any future cases of deten-
tion of or criminal proceedings against German nationals, the United
States will ensure in law and practice the effective exercise of the
rights under Article 36 of the [VCCR]. In particular in cases involving
the death penalty, this requires the United States to provide effective
review of and remedies for criminal convictions impaired by a violation
of the rights under Article 36."
Id. 9. 117.
59. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
60. See Final Judgment, supra note 1, 11 74, 77.
61. See id. 74. By fourteen votes to one (Judge Oda voting against), the
ICJ held that
by not informing Karl and Walter LaGrand without delay following
their arrest of their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1(b), of the
[VCCR], and by thereby depriving the Federal Republic of Germany of
the possibility, in a timely fashion, to render the assistance provided
for by the [VCCR] to the individuals concerned, the United States of
America breached its obligations to the Federal Republic of Germany
and to the LaGrand brothers under Article 36, paragraph 1[.]
Id. 9 128(3).
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dered such assistance, or whether a different verdict
would have been rendered. It is sufficient that the Con-
vention conferred these rights, and that Germany and the
LaGrands were in effect prevented by the breach of the
United States from exercising them, had they so chosen.62
In addition, the ICJ concluded that Article 36, paragraph
1 of the VCCR creates rights for individuals, not simply rights
for state parties to the treaty. 3 "[T]he Court concludes that
Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual rights, which...
may be invoked in this Court by the national State of the de-
tained person. These rights were violated in the present
case."
64
B. The Effect of the "Procedural Default" Rule
The ICJ next considered the extent to which the applica-
tion of the U.S. doctrine of procedural default contributed to
the violation of the VCCR in the LaGrands' cases. The court
emphasized the distinction between the rule itself and its
specific application in the LaGrands' cases.65 The court found
that the rule itself does not violate the VCCR.66 The court
held
The problem arises when the procedural default rule does
not allow the detained individual to challenge a conviction
and sentence by claiming, in reliance on Article 36, para-
62. Id. $ 74. This holding stands in stark contrast to numerous cases de-
cided by U.S. courts that held prejudice to the defendant resulting from the
treaty breach was necessary before any application for relief would be enter-
tained. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377 (citing Arizona v. Fulmi-
nante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991)); United States v. Ademaj, 170 F.3d 58 (1st Cir.
1999). For a more detailed discussion of the requirement of prejudice in U.S.
law, see Schiffman, supra note 7, at 42-44; Kadish, supra note 7, at 602-09.
63. See Final Judgment, supra note 1, 77. The ICJ's holding that Article
36 creates individual rights is consistent with the Inter-American Court of Hu-
man Rights advisory opinion on this question. See Advisory Opinion OC-16/99,
supra note 14.
64. Final Judgment, supra note 1, $ 77. The spirit of this finding contrasts
with holdings by U.S. courts that expressed doubt as to whether Article 36 cre-
ates rights that flow directly to individual criminal defendants and are there-
fore directly enforceable by U.S. courts (i.e., whether or not the VCCR is a "self-
executing treaty"). See supra note 7 and accompanying text. It is important to
note, however, that although related, the question of whether a treaty is self-
executing for the purpose of domestic law is a very different question from
whether rights of individuals created by treaty are justiciable in international
law before an international tribunal.
65. See Final Judgment, supra note 1, 9 90.
66. See id.
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graph 1, of the [VCCR], that the competent national au-
thorities failed to comply with their obligation to provide
the requisite consular information "without delay," thus
preventing the person from seeking and obtaining consu-
67lar assistance from the sending State.
The ICJ found that Germany had a right at the request
of the LaGrands "to arrange for [their] legal representation. '
Furthermore, because the American authorities failed to
comply with their obligation under Article 36(1)(b), the proce-
dural default rule prevented counsel for the LaGrands from
effectively challenging their convictions under anything ex-
cept U.S. Constitutional standards.69 Accordingly, the ICJ
held that, "[u]nder these circumstances, the procedural de-
fault rule had the effect of preventing 'full effect [from being]
given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this
article are intended,' and thus violated paragraph 2 of ArticleY).70
36 .
67. Id. By fourteen votes to one (Judge Oda voting against) the ICJ held
that
by not permitting the review and reconsideration, in the light of the
rights set forth in the [VCCR], of the convictions and sentences of the
LaGrand brothers after the violations referred to in paragraph [128](3)
above had been established, the United States of America breached its
obligation to the Federal Republic of Germany and to the LaGrand
brothers under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the [VCCR] [.1
Id. $I 128(4).
68. Id. $ 91. Germany ultimately provided them some assistance to that
effect.
69. See id.
As a result, although United States courts could and did examine the
professional competence of counsel assigned to the indigent LaGrands
by reference to United States constitutional standards, the procedural
default rule prevented them from attaching any legal significance to
the fact, inter alia, that the violation of the rights set forth in Article
36, paragraph 1, prevented Germany, in a timely fashion, from retain-
ing private counsel for them and otherwise assisting in their defence as
provided for by the [VCCR].
Id. In other words, the ICJ concluded that the U.S. breach of Article 36(1)(b)
was a direct causative factor in why the LaGrands did not raise the VCCR issue
and thus procedurally defaulted the claim. See id. This must be contrasted
with key U.S. cases where courts held that the burden was on defense counsel
to discover and raise the issue. See, e.g., Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 619-20
(4th Cir. 1998); Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1997). Re-
gardless of whether the failure to advise of the VCCR rights was actually a fac-
tor in why the issue was procedurally defaulted, in the LaGrands' case, the pro-
cedural default rule deprived them of a forum to raise the issue of the treaty
once counsel with the support of Germany was working on their behalf.
70. Final Judgment, supra note 1, $ 91.
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C. The Effect of the Order of Provisional Measures: Binding
or Not?
The one aspect of LaGrand that reaches far beyond the
VCCR and international aspects of the death penalty is its
contribution to the status of provisional measures as an in-
strument of the ICJ. The ICJ's clear pronouncement on this
point in LaGrand will reverberate throughout the ICJ's fu-
ture jurisprudence and surely will impact the use of provi-
sional measures in other international tribunals as well.
Germany asked the ICJ to adjudge the United States'
failure to follow the provisional Order to take all measures at
its disposal to ensure Walter LaGrand was not executed
pending the final decision by the ICJ, as a violation of inter-
national law in its own right.7 To support its argument,
Germany referred to key provisions of the U.N. Charter and
the ICJ Statute."' In response, the United States claimed the
specific language of the Order was by its own terms non-
binding,7 but that it had, in any event, complied with the Or-
der by immediately transmitting it to the Governor of Ari-
zona.74 In addition, the United States argued that it was con-
strained from fulfilling the Order because of the
extraordinarily short time between the issuance of the Order
and Walter LaGrand's execution75 and "the character of the
[U.S.] as a federal republic of divided powers."76 Most signifi-
cantly, the United States maintained that orders of provi-
71. See id. B 92. For the full text of Germany's submission pertaining to the
status of a violation of the Order of provisional measures (third submission), see
supra note 57.
72. See id. 93. Among the provisions that Germany invoked was Article
41(1) of the ICJ Statute. See id. For the full text of Article 41 of the ICJ Stat-
ute, see supra text accompanying note 38. In addition, Germany invoked Arti-
cle 94(1) of the U.N. Charter. See id. Article 94(1) of the Charter provides that
"[e] ach member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of
the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a party." U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 1. It
is noteworthy to recall that the ICJ Statute is an integral part of the U.N. Char-
ter. See id. art. 92.
73. See Final Judgment, supra note 1, 96. For a more detailed discussion
of the U.S. position that the ICJ Order was by its own terms non-binding, see
Contemporary Practice, supra note 17, at 652-54.
74. See Final Judgment, supra note 1, 95.
75. See id.
76. Id. In other words, the U.S. federal government is limited in its ability
to halt an execution of a state prisoner, convicted and sentenced in a state court
under state law. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see infra text ac-
companying notes 112-21.
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sional measures by the ICJ do not, as a matter of interna-
tional law, create binding obligations for the states against
which they are issued.
In what is already being referred to as a milestone deci-
sion by theICJ, the court held that orders of provisional
measures by the ICJ pursuant to Article 41 of its Statute do
in fact create binding obligations in international law." In-
ternational legal scholars, and observers of the ICJ in gen-
eral, will be impressed by the court's detailed and careful ex-
position of its own Statute.7 ' Following this finding, the ICJ
naturally went on to conclude that the United States not only
violated the VCCR in the first instance, but also its additional
legal obligation to comply with the ICJ's Order. °
The ICJ specifically noted the Governor of Arizona's dis-
regard of the Order" and the U.S. Supreme Court's rejection
of Germany's application for a stay of execution." The ICJ
77. See Final Judgment, supra note 1, 96. For a more detailed discussion
of the U.S. position that ICJ orders of provisional measures do not create bind-
ing obligations in international law, see Contemporary Practice, supra note 17,
at 652-54.
78. See Final Judgment, supra note 1, 109. "[Tlhe Court has reached the
conclusion that orders on provisional measures under Article 41 have binding
effect." Id. To reach this seminal conclusion, the ICJ meticulously examined
several factors including the text of the Statute, a comparison of the French and
English versions, and the travaux prdparatoires-the preparatory documents of
the treaty. See id. $ 98-109. By thirteen votes to two (Judges Oda and Parra-
Aranguren voting against), the ICJ held that
by failing to take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter
LaGrand was not executed pending the final decision of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in the case, the United States of America
breached the obligation incumbent upon it under the Order indicating
provisional measures issued by the Court on 3 March 1999[.]
Id. $1 128(5).
79. See id. H 98-116.
80. See id. 115.
81. See id. $ 113. "It is... noteworthy that the Governor of Arizona, to
whom the Court's Order had been transmitted, decided not to give effect to it,
even though the Arizona Clemency Board had recommended a stay of execution
for Walter LaGrand." Id.
82. See id. 9 114.
[T]he United States Supreme Court rejected a separate application by
Germany for a stay of execution, "[gliven the tardiness of the pleas and
the jurisdictional barriers they implicate." Yet it would have been open
to the Supreme Court, as one of its members urged, to grant a prelimi-
nary stay, which would have given it "time to consider, after briefing
from all interested parties, the jurisdictional and international legal is-
sues involved .... "
Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Federal Republic of Germany v.
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held,
The review of the above steps taken by the authorities of
the United States with regard to the Order of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice of 3 March 1999 indicates that the
various competent United States authorities failed to take
all the steps they could have taken to give effect to the
Court's Order. The Order did not require the United
States to exercise powers it did not have; but it did impose
the obligation to "take all measures at its disposal to en-
sure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the fi-
nal decision in these proceedings. . ." The Court finds that
the United States did not discharge this obligation.83
Having adjudged the United States in violation of both
the VCCR and the ICJ's Order to delay Walter LaGrand's
execution, the ICJ turned to the question of what assurances
the United States must provide to ensure that such violations
do not recur in the future.
D. "Review and Reconsideration" of Convictions and
Sentences
In response to Germany's request that the United States
provide certain assurances to prevent further VCCR viola-
tions, the ICJ noted that throughout the proceedings, the
United States made assurances that it was working inten-
sively to improve understanding of and compliance with con-
sular notification and access requirements in the United
States to guard against future violations.84 The United States
repeated in all phases of the proceedings that it is carrying
out a "vast and detailed programme" to ensure future compli-
ance at the federal, state and local levels.85 The ICJ credited
the U.S. statements and found them to satisfy a general as-
surance of non-repetition.86
United States, 526 U.S. 111, 112 (per curiam), 113 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
83. Id. 115.
84. See id. 121. Specifically, the United States referred to a January 1998
publication promulgated by the U.S. State Department entitled, Consular Noti-fication and Access: Instructions for Federal, State and Local Law Enforcement
and Other Officials Regarding Foreign Nationals in the United States and the
Rights of Consular Officials to Assist Them. A copy of this publication may be
available at the U.S. State Department Web site at
http:www.state.gov/www/global/legal-affairs/ca-notification/ca~prelim.html
(last visited Apr. 14, 2002).
85. Final Judgment, supra note 1, % 123.
86. Id. % 124. By unanimous vote the ICJ took note of
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Above and beyond the repeated assurances, the United
States also offered an apology to Germany for the breach of
Article 36.7 Germany did not seek "material reparation" for
the injury resulting to either the LaGrand brothers or Ger-
many itself as a state.88 Germany did seek, however, assur-
ances that in future cases involving German nationals that
the United States would ensure in law and practice the effec-
tive exercise of the VCCR.8" Emphasizing cases involving the
death penalty in particular, Germany requested an "effective
review of and remedies for criminal convictions impaired by
the violation of the rights under Article 36. "90
Upon consideration of this final submission by Germany,
the ICJ ruled,
The Court considers in this respect that if the United
States, notwithstanding its commitment [to improve com-
pliance with the VCCR], should fail in its obligation of
consular notification to the detriment of German nation-
als, an apology would not suffice in cases where the indi-
viduals concerned have been subjected to prolonged deten-
tion or convicted and sentenced to severe penalties. In the
case of such a conviction and sentence, it would be incum-
bent upon the United States to allow the review and re-
consideration of the conviction and sentence by taking ac-
count of the violation of the rights set forth in the [VCCR].
This obligation can be carried out in various ways. The
choice of means must be left to the United States.91
the commitment undertaken by the United States of America to ensure
implementation of the specific measures adopted in performance of its
obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1(b), of the Convention; and
finds that this commitment must be regarded as meeting the Federal
Republic of Germany's request for a general assurance of non-
repetition.
Id. 128(6).




91. Id. (emphasis added). By fourteen votes to one (Judge Oda voting
against), the ICJ held that
should nationals of the Federal Republic of Germany nonetheless be
sentenced to severe penalties, without their rights under Article 36,
paragraph 1 (b), of the [VCCRI having been respected, the United
States of America, by means of its own choosing, shall allow the review
and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account of
the violation of the rights set forth in [the VCCR].
Id. 128(7).
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This holding requiring possible "review and reconsidera-
tion" by the United States of convictions and sentences, yet
leaving the means to accomplish this in the hands of U.S. au-
thorities, no doubt will give rise to considerably more litiga-
tion and controversy in the event of future VCCR violations.
The next section discusses the potential impact of LaGrand
and possible future scenarios in U.S. courts.
V. FUTURE IMPACT OF THE LAGRAND DECISION
Despite U.S. assurances of improvement in its compli-
ance with the VCCR, the letter and spirit of Article 36 surely
will be tested in the future. This is particularly probable if
large numbers of foreign defendants are charged in U.S.
courts pursuant to anti-terrorist legislation and executive or-
ders enacted in response to the terrorist attacks upon the
United States on September 11, 2001. Some foreign govern-
ments already have raised the issue of VCCR compliance in
this context.9" This, of course, is in addition to the usual
number of cases involving criminal and immigration matters
where foreign nationals are detained.
This section will address potential scenarios where La-
Grand may be directly applicable. It will not address the
more ordinary (and far more numerous) situations where vio-
lations of Article 36 should be raised and litigated by criminal
defense and immigration counsel in a timely and appropriate
way. Accordingly, this section will concentrate on two key
questions. First, how might a state prisoner under sentence
of death benefit from the ICJ's requirement of "review and re-
consideration" of a conviction and sentence obtained following
a violation of the VCCR? Second, how may a state prisoner
under sentence of death benefit from an order of provisional
measures to delay an execution in light of the ICJ's holding
92. See Barbara Crossette, Diplomats Protest Lack of Information, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2001, at B5 (detailing complaints by foreign diplomats, includ-
ing non-access to detained nationals); David E. Sanger, President Defends Mili-
tary Tribunals in Terrorist Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at Al (specifying a
protest by the Egyptian Foreign Minister to U.S. Secretary of State Colin L.
Powell that Egyptian diplomats had not been given the names of several dozen
Egyptian citizens detained by the United States); William Glaberson, A Frus-
trated A.C.L. U. Tries to Guide Consulates Through a Thicket, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
2, 2001, at All (discussing an offer by the A.C.L.U. to advise foreign consulates




that they create binding obligations in international law?
What follows are some informed observations about novel
and complex issues involving the relationship between inter-
national law and U.S. law. Under no circumstances should
one consider this analysis exhaustive or decisive.
A. How May a Death Penalty Inmate Obtain "Review and
Reconsideration" Following LaGrand?
After LaGrand, it is natural for inmates convicted by
U.S. courts following VCCR violations to seek to challenge
their convictions and sentences in light of the ICJ's decision
and its clear emphasis on the importance of VCCR rights.
This is especially so in capital cases. Exactly how such chal-
lenges may be implemented, however, remains to be seen.
The Valdez case in Oklahoma surely will serve as a test case
for similarly situated death row inmates in American pris-
ons." In Valdez v. State, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals clearly has signaled the seriousness of the VCCR is-
sue and the significance of LaGrand as an important new fac-
tor in the legal landscape.94 While other courts may also ap-
preciate the significance of the ICJ's decision, the ability of
death row inmates to successfully utilize LaGrand likely will
prove difficult.
First, as a matter of international law, ICJ judgments
have no binding effect except as between the parties and only
as to that particular case.95 Thus, only Germany is in a posi-
tion to claim any direct benefit from the decision. LaGrand
only contemplates a possible review and reconsideration of
convictions and sentences of German nationals."96 In addition,
the particular language of the holding, "if the United States
should fail in its obligation of consular notification to the det-
riment of German nationals, an apology would not suffice" "
by its own terms would arguably apply prospectively. That is,
the holding would apply only after the United States has had
93. See Valdez v. State, No. PCD-2001-1011 (Okla. Crim. App. filed Aug. 22,
2001).
94. See Order Staying Execution at 2, Valdez v. State (No. PCD-2001-1011)
("The court has before it a unique and serious matter involving novel legal is-
sues and international law.").
95. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 59.
96. See Final Judgment, supra note 1, J 125.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
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a full and fair opportunity to improve its compliance with Ar-
ticle 36. Therefore, any inmate, of German nationality or
otherwise, whose conviction and sentence occurred pre-
LaGrand, would not likely be entitled to any reconsideration.
Even in cases where "review and reconsideration" would
be appropriate, the ICJ accorded broad discretion to the
United States to accomplish this task. 8 Whether "review and
reconsideration" in any case spawned by LaGrand will occur
at the judicial, executive or legislative levels remains to be
seen. In theory, however, there is no reason that all branches
of government cannot help fulfill this role. This might take
the form of closer scrutiny in applications for executive clem-
ency, petitions before parole boards, applications (or re-
applications) for habeas corpus, motions for resentencing, and
state and federal legislation recognizing the significance of
VCCR rights in post-conviction relief procedures.
There is no question that LaGrand contemplates a sig-
nificant change in practice by U.S. officials to improve United
States compliance with the VCCR. This is certainly true with
regard to death penalty cases where the ICJ singled out those
individuals, who "have been subjected to prolonged detention
or convicted and sentenced to severe penalties."9 In Valdez,
although Mr. Valdez is Mexican, not German, the importance
of LaGrand has permitted further consideration of Valdez's
case.' °° This potential exists in other similar cases.
1. Successive Petitions for Habeas Corpus
The potential for a successive petition for habeas corpus
where the VCCR had been determined to be procedurally de-
98. See id. For the full text of the ICJ holding granting broad discretion toU.S. officials to accomplish "review and reconsideration," see supra text accom-
panying note 91.
99. Final Judgment, supra note 1, $ 125. Admittedly, it is somewhat curi-
ous that the ICJ designated those inmates "subjected to prolonged detention or
convicted and sentenced to severe penalties" without specific reference to the
death penalty. On the other hand, it appears beyond doubt that the ICJ was
referring to the death penalty in addition to a class of other less defined "severe
penalties." The inclusion of those subjected to "prolonged detention" with those
'convicted and sentenced to severe penalties" most logically highlights the im-portance of VCCR rights for immigration detainees and criminal suspects held
for long periods of time, as well as sentenced prisoners.
100. Following the ICJ's decision in LaGrand, Valdez filed an application for
a stay of execution based upon, among other factors, the important issue of in-
ternational law. For a procedural history of Valdez, see supra note 18.
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faulted is, at least in the short term, the most likely scenario
where LaGrand will be raised in U.S. courts in death penalty
cases. A successive habeas petition, however, presents sub-
stantial obstacles that must be overcome and is therefore
worthy of discussion.
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA")1 1 severely limits successive petitions for habeas
corpus in federal court. 1 2 Where a habeas petition has been
filed previously, AEDPA requires all subsequent petitions be
dismissed if the claim was presented previously.' There may
be considerable debate as to whether a VCCR claim, proce-
durally defaulted or otherwise, can be considered as actually
raised in a previous habeas application where the inmate
seeks review and reconsideration based upon LaGrand.
Should a court consider a post-LaGrand petition to be old
wine in a new bottle, that is, indistinguishable from a garden-
variety VCCR claim, it would likely be constrained to dismiss
the petition. On the other hand, if a new petition is consid-
ered to be a brand new application flowing from the lCJ's au-
thoritative interpretation of international law in LaGrand, it
would still need to satisfy the requirements of a claim based
on new law.
The prospect of raising the VCCR post-LaGrand in a suc-
cessive habeas petition, as a claim based on new law, is also
quite problematic. AEDPA limits successive petitions based
on new law to "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroac-
tive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that
101. AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-66 (2000).
102. For a discussion of the ramifications of AEDPA in capital cases, see
Kenneth Williams, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: What's
Wrong With It and How to Fix It, 33 CONN. L. REV. 919 (2001). For a thorough
review of the law with regard to successive habeas petitions in death penalty
cases after AEDPA, see Randal S. Jeffrey, Successive Habeas Corpus Petitions
and Section 2255 Motions After the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996: Emerging Procedural and Substantive Issues, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 43
(2000). For a general critique of procedures in death penalty cases, including a
review of post-conviction relief, see James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of
Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030 (2000). See also Mark Hansen, Death Knell for
Death Row? 86 A.B.A. J. 40 (2000) (discussing the controversy over the death
penalty in the U.S., including objections to appellate and post-conviction relief
procedures).
103. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). Section 2244 is entitled, "Finality of Deter-
mination." Section 2244(b)(1) states simply that "[a] claim presented in a second
or successive habeas corpus under 2254 that was presented in a prior applica-
tion shall be dismissed." Id.
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was previously unavailable[.]1 " Therefore, if a successive pe-
tition were to be available in federal court, it would require a
validation by the U.S. Supreme Court that the VCCR issue is
a matter of constitutional magnitude, and specifically held to
be retroactive.
Although treaties traditionally are regarded as having
the normative rank of a federal statute, and are therefore in-
ferior to the Constitution,"°5 a finding of constitutional propor-
tion would not be inappropriate based upon the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution which renders treaties "the su-
preme Law of the Land[.]" °6 While it may be well settled that
treaties in their own right are subordinate to the Constitu-
tion, one cannot conclude that an issue of treaty law can
never attain constitutional proportion. On the contrary, a
genuine question as to the status and applicability of a treaty
in U.S. law can be predicated on the Supremacy Clause itself,
not simply the treaty.
Under any circumstances, however, before a successive
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). For a discussion of claims based on new law,
see Jeffrey, supra note 102, at 126-27. AEDPA severely limited the ability to
bring habeas petitions based on new law and embraced the requirement of
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), that the new law the petition relies upon
be of constitutional magnitude. This superseded the less restrictive standard
that permitted a new application if the inmate could show cause for the default.
See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-91 (1977); Francis v. Henderson, 425
U.S. 536 (1975). Indicating the extraordinarily high standard for relief under
the "new law" exception, the U.S Supreme Court recently construed it in most
rigid terms. See Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001) (denying a state prisoner's
habeas corpus petition predicated upon a new interpretation of due process
adopted by the Supreme Court but not specifically held to be retroactive).
105. See Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829). For an incisive analysis
of the constitutional status of treaties and a review of noteworthy U.S. treaty
breaches in history including some discussion of the VCCR, see Detlev F. Vagts,
The United States and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95 AM. J. INT'L L.
313 (2001).
106. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause provides as fol-
lows:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
Id. (emphasis added). The U.S. Supreme Court noted the status of the VCCR,
and treaties in general, in the hierarchy of U.S. law in Breard v. Greene, 523
U.S. 371, 376 (1998). See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957); Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
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habeas petition can be brought in federal court, it will still
need to satisfy the exhaustion of state remedies require-
ment.1°7 This requires a review of the applicable state proce-
dural laws with regard to successive petitions of post-
conviction relief to determine if any remaining remedies exist
in state court.' If further state review is available, the mat-
ter is barred from federal court until it has been exhausted.
Consistent with this observation, the post-LaGrand applica-
tion in Valdez is in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals,
not federal court.
Unquestionably, great difficulties exist to obtaining
meaningful "review and reconsideration" following LaGrand.
The sheer novelty of the issue will require creative lawyering
to secure effective implementation of this aspect of the ICJ's
holding. The mechanisms to achieve "review and reconsid-
eration" of convictions and sentences will probably not be es-
tablished with any consistency for some time, and even then,
remedies probably will differ from case to case. Despite sub-
stantial barriers in U.S. law, LaGrand is ultimately an au-
thoritative interpretation of international law with significant
implications for the U.S. domestically and internationally.
This reality should weigh heavily in the judgment of U.S.
courts and relevant agencies of the executive branch as to
whether or not they will grant some form of "review and re-
consideration" in the wake of LaGrand.
LaGrand raises the potential for a scenario even more
daunting than obtaining effective "review and reconsidera-
tion." That is, how will the U.S. respond in the future if the
ICJ issues an order of provisional measures to stay an execu-
tion pending consideration of international legal issues?
B. Will the United States Comply with Future ICJ Orders of
Provisional Measures?
As mentioned previously, the most enduring legacy of
107. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). "An applicant shall not be deemed to have ex-
hausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of
this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any avail-
able procedure, the question presented." Id.
108. See Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1134-35 (10th Cir. 1999); Rogers
v. Gibson, 173 F.3d 1278, 1289-90 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying subsequent
amendments to state post-conviction procedures to determine that a claim was
not procedurally defaulted).
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LaGrand is likely to be its clear statement that ICJ orders of
provisional measures constitute binding obligations in inter-
national law.' With this unequivocal revelation based on a
meticulous interpretation of its own statute, the ICJ signaled
the importance of its provisional powers not just to the death
penalty, but also to the many challenging cases expected to
grace its docket in the 21s century. This no doubt will include
various issues such as human rights, use of military force and
the global environment.
It is certainly foreseeable that other countries whose na-
tionals are facing the death penalty in the United States un-
der similar circumstances will seek assistance from the ICJ."0
Should cases similar to Breard and LaGrand come before the
ICJ, and should the ICJ issue a provisional order to delay an
execution, U.S. authorities at all levels can no longer rely
upon the unilateral interpretation of the U.S. Government
that provisional measures of the ICJ are not binding."'
On the contrary, considering the United States' obliga-
tions under the U.N. Charter,"' the United States would be
required to comply with such orders in the future as a matter
of international law. At a minimum, this should entail the
executive branch of the federal government supporting a stay
of execution, and communicating this forcefully to state ex-
ecutive and judicial authorities, in any case where the ICJ
would issue a similar order. Since the executive branch's ul-
timately incorrect interpretation of the status of provisional
measures was decisive in the case of Walter LaGrand,"'
109. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying texts.
110. In both Breard and LaGrand, the United States as well as Paraguay
and Germany respectively, were members of the Optional Protocol of the VCCR,
which conferred jurisdiction upon the ICJ regarding disputes arising from the
treaty. See Optional Protocol, supra note 34. The ICJ also may obtain jurisdic-
tion over states by other means set forth in Article 36 of the ICJ Statute. See
supra note 34.
111. For the interpretation of the executive branch with the regard to the
status of provisional measures and the great deference accorded it by the U.S.
Supreme Court, see supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
112. See Final Judgment, supra note 1, IT 109-110 ; U.N. CHARTER art. 94,
para. 1.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54. In Breard, the Supreme
Court displayed a similar skepticism of the status of provisional measures. "If
the Governor [of Virginia] wishes to wait for the [final] decision of the ICJ, that
is his prerogative. But nothing in our existing law allows us to make that
choice for him." Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 378 (1998). For a discussion of
the availability of federal power to compel compliance with ICJ orders of provi-
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surely a U.S. court could credit a more authoritative and de-
fmitive position by the executive to the contrary in a future
case.
By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, individual U.S. states
are bound by treaty obligations and, at least in theory, should
abide by ICJ provisional measures ordering a stay of execu-
tion. Where this does not occur, however, and where an indi-
vidual U.S. state signals its unwillingness to delay an execu-
tion in the face of an order by the ICJ to the contrary, the
executive branch of the U.S. federal government may be re-
quired to pursue legal remedies against that state."4 Even if
such actions are ultimately unsuccessful, they may be neces-
sary to fulfill the United States' obligation to "take all meas-
ures at its disposal""5 to ensure that the execution is delayed.
At a minimum, it would demonstrate a good faith attempt by
the executive branch to comply with an ICJ order in a com-
plex domestic legal framework that needs to balance federal
supremacy with states' rights.
1. Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition
There is no decisive or clearly defined legal mechanism
available to federal authorities to challenge a state's refusal
to abide by an ICJ order of provisional measures. One possi-
bility would be for the Justice Department to apply for a writ
of mandamus or prohibition in federal court. The writ would
be directed against a state official, such as a governor or
commissioner of correction, who has custody of the inmate.
Such writs are ancient common law remedies116 and are au-
sional measures in the context of the Breard case, see Carlos Manuel Vizquez,
AGORA: Breard and the Federal Power to Require Compliance with ICJ Orders
of Provisional Measures, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 683 (1998).
114. See infra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
115. The ICJ orders in both Breard and LaGrand contained this language.
See supra notes 10, 42 and accompanying text. Therefore, it is foreseeable that
a future order also would include this phrase.
116. As every first-year law student is aware, the landmark case of Marbury
v. Madison involved the mandamus power of the federal courts. See Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). A writ of mandamus is "issued from a
court to an official compelling performance of a ministerial act that the law rec-
ognizes as an absolute duty...." GIFIS' LAW DICTIONARY 282 (2d ed. 1984). For
a historical review of the writ of mandamus in U.S. law, see Jerry J. Phillips,
Marbury v. Madison and Section 13 of the 1789 Judiciary Act, 60 TENN. L. REV.
51 (1992). A writ of prohibition is "a prerogative writ issued by a superior court
to a lower court that prevents an inferior court or tribunal from exceeding its
jurisdiction or usurping jurisdiction which it has not been given by law. ...
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thorized by Congress to be issued in the federal courts."7 Be-
cause of the extraordinary nature of these writs and the pre-
vailing sensitivity to states' rights, it is foreseeable that the
federal courts would grant them with great reluctance. The
possibility of pursuing writs of mandamus and prohibition in
state court, under applicable state law, also should be inves-
tigated.
In the past, the federal courts have expressed reserva-
tions when asked to exercise their mandamus power to inter-
fere with state governmental functions."' Nevertheless, an
application for prohibition or mandamus to delay an execu-
tion may provide a direct, albeit imperfect, mechanism to
force the issue of an ICJ order before a state official. This is
especially so where the operation of a state criminal justice
system is in violation of the United States' obligations under
international law and where the executive branch of the fed-
eral government is the entity bringing the application. Tradi-
tionally, the federal courts have shown great deference to the
executive branch on matters of international affairs."' As
such, the matter of an ICJ order certainly would qualify.
Of course, the executive branch of the federal government
is not the only interested party. The state of nationality of
the inmate and the inmate himself may seek to enforce the
order in their own right. Petitions for mandamus and prohi-
bition by these parties probably present even greater obsta-
cles. In the case of foreign governments, they are constrained
Where the action sought to be prohibited is judicial in nature the writ may be
exercised against public officers." GIFIS' LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 522. For a
review of the historical roots of the writ of prohibition, see CHARLES M. GRAY,
THE WRIT OF PROHIBITION IN EARLY MODERN ENGLISH LAW (1994).
117. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). "The Supreme Court and all courts established
by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." Id.
118. See Smith v. Thompson, 437 F. Supp. 189 (D.C. Tenn., 1976), affd, 559
F.2d 1221, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 907 (denying writ of mandamus to Tennessee
criminal court requiring it to act on petition of post-conviction relief); Demos v.
U.S. Dist. Ct. for E. Dist. of Wash., 925 F.2d 1160, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1123
(1991) (finding Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to issue writ of mandamus to
state court); Siler v. Storey, 587 F. Supp. 986 (D.C. Tex. 1984) (holding Texas
Court of Appeals is not an inferior court to which federal district court could is-
sue writ of prohibition or mandamus).
119. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-14 (1962). In another landmark
case, Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court recognized the supremacy of the




by the Eleventh Amendment. As discussed earlier, in the
case of Walter LaGrand, the application by Germany to en-
force the ICJ's Order to delay the execution was restricted not
only by the executive branch's interpretation of the Order,20
but also by the constitutional limitation on foreign govern-
ments to bring such actions.
121
An application brought directly by an inmate to enforce
an ICJ order surely would face a strong objection to standing.
As judgments of the ICJ only create obligations between na-
tion-states,122 the federal courts have rejected the ability of
individual litigants to claim rights from them.2 ' Unless a
court is prepared to draw a distinction between a final judg-
ment of the ICJ and an interim order, which necessarily rests
on an even weaker jurisdictional basis, it is highly unlikely
that a death row inmate can directly avail himself of an ICJ
provisional order issued on his behalf. The irony of such ex-
clusion notwithstanding, it is consistent with U.S. case law to
date.
Despite the great procedural obstacles to raising the
VCCR with renewed vigor after LaGrand, it remains that this
country now has a forceful and authoritative interpretation
on important rights provided by a treaty to which the United
States is a party. LaGrand not only highlights the impor-
tance of VCCR rights but also points out the admittedly poor
record of U.S. compliance. Most importantly, the VCCR is a
treaty that provides rights to Americans traveling abroad as
surely as it provides rights to foreign nationals detained in
the United States. All of these factors should weigh heavily
in decisions to grant effective "review and reconsideration" as
well as respect for future orders of provisional measures by
the ICJ.
120. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 43-44, 47 and accompanying text.
122. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 59.
123. See Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d
929, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1988). "Neither individuals nor organizations have a cause
of action in an American court to enforce ICJ judgments." Id. For a scholarly
discussion of the effect of ICJ decisions on U.S. courts using Breard as a refer-
ence point, see Sanja Djajic, The Effect of International Court of Justice Deci-
sions on Municipal Courts in the United States: Breard v. Greene, 23 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 27 (1999).
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C. Other Influences of LaGrand and Suggestions for
Implementation
The real impact of the LaGrand case probably will be felt
in the practices and policies of law enforcement in its applica-
tion of the VCCR, as well as in judicial review of VCCR is-
sues. The United States has yet to feel the effects of the
large-scale program to improve its compliance with the VCCR
that was promised to the ICJ in LaGrand.'24 One factor that
would improve compliance and give the VCCR more visible
status in U.S law would be to enact state and federal legisla-
tion requiring law enforcement to administer Article 36 rights
to foreign detainees as part of Miranda warnings. The State
of California took an important step in this direction when it
enacted a statute requiring peace officers to notify foreign na-
tionals of their VCCR rights if they are detained for more
than two hours.'25 Florida has enacted similar legislation.!2
If other states, and perhaps the U.S. Congress, take their
lead, Article 36 rights could well be on their way to becoming
part of the regular Miranda warnings routinely administered
to criminal suspects.
All else aside, the rights set forth in Article 36 are
straightforward, easy to administer, and create minimal bur-
dens on law enforcement personnel. State and federal legis-
lation mandating these rights would be a substantial step to-
ward improved compliance. It also would remove any further
argument about the VCCR's status as a self-executing or non-
self-executing treaty. Concerning the debate over the VCCR's
status as a self-executing treaty, the ICJ's clear pronounce-
ment that the treaty creates individual rights 27 should be
given great weight by any U.S. court considering the question
of self-execution.
In addition, after LaGrand, it is likely that some courts
at the trial level will start to look more closely at the imposi-
tion of certain remedies for violation of VCCR rights. Al-
though a thorough discussion of potential judicial remedies
for VCCR violations is beyond the scope of this article, it has
been suggested that such remedies should include the dis-
124. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
125. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 834c(a)(1) (2001).
126. See FLA. STAT. CH. 901.26(3) and 288.816(2)(f) (2001).
127. See Final Judgment, supra note 1, 77, 89
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missal of criminal cases and suppression of evidence; in other
words, to restore the status quo ante."' Admittedly, there is
nothing in U.S. law to suggest such remedies are viable. At
the same time, the lCJ's clear endorsement of the rights pro-
vided for by the VCCR should be persuasive to U.S. courts on
the question of self-execution. Similarly, LaGrand should
animate criminal defense motions for some form of appropri-
ate and reasonable remedy with the objective of nullifying the
effect of the treaty breach where in fact the defendant is
prejudiced by it.
On the other hand, in the context of post-conviction relief
in capital cases, the fact of the VCCR violation and its possi-
ble impact on the trial and sentence should be considered in
deciding whether to commute a death sentence in an applica-
tion for clemency. This would be entirely consistent with the
ICJ's mandate of "review and reconsideration" where such re-
view is applicable. The weight given to the treaty breach as a
factor in a decision to commute logically should flow from,
among other things, the possibility that consular officials
could have provided evidence of mitigation that would have
been available during the sentencing phase had they been no-
tified in a timely fashion. As all death penalty attorneys are
aware, the issue of mitigation during the sentencing phase of
the trial is often the most critical aspect of a capital case.'29
Furthermore, during habeas corpus review, courts should
consider more seriously whether the application of the proce-
dural default rule to bar a VCCR claim works to prevent full
effect from being given to the treaty in a given case.' This is
128. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Restitution as a Remedy in U.S. Courts for Viola-
tions of International Law, 95 AM. J. INVL L. 341, 346-48. See also Kadish, su-
pra note 7, at 610-11.
129. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (finding that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments require a full opportunity to present evidence of miti-
gating circumstances in capital cases); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1981) (applying Lockett to reverse a death sentence where the trial court ex-
cluded evidence of mitigation offered at the sentencing hearing). For a scholarly
discussion of the importance of mitigation to capital cases, see Lindsay H. To-
menson & Hannah M. Stott-Bumsted, Thirteenth Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: Introduction and Guide for Users: IV. Sentencing: Capital Punish-
ment, 89 GEO. L.J. 1738, 1751-56 (2001).
130. In LaGrand, the ICJ noted that the application of the procedural default
rule to preclude judicial consideration of the VCCR during post-conviction re-
view had the effect of preventing full effect of the VCCR. Final Judgment, su-
pra note 1, % 91. See supra text accompanying note 70.
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especially true where the violation of Article 36(1)(b) is itself
an assault upon the object and purpose of the treaty in the
first instance.
In determining whether a VCCR claim has been proce-
durally defaulted, U.S. courts may need to reconsider the ap-
plication of the "later-in-time" rule. This rule states that
when a statute, which is subsequent to a treaty at issue, is
inconsistent with the treaty, the statute will prevail over the
treaty to the extent of the conflict.' In Breard, the U.S. Su-
preme Court relied upon the "later-in-time" rule to find that
Breard procedurally defaulted his VCCR claim.3 ' Specifi-
cally, the Court so held because AEDPA was enacted after the
VCCR 133 The difficulty with the application of "later-in-time"
in this almost mechanical fashion to bar a VCCR claim from
habeas review, is that it can, and in fact has, lead to detri-
mental effects for the United States on the international
plane.13 1 Moreover, as in LaGrand and Breard, the applica-
tion of the rule by itself can undermine the purposes of the
VCCR. That is, it deprives detained individuals of a forum to
litigate the issue at a critical stage in the case, especially
where there is no other pre-determined or established
mechanism to address VCCR violations.
Some scholars have raised strong objections to the appli-
cation of the "later-in-time" rule to prevent a petitioner from
raising an Article 36 violation at federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings.13 1 In particular, there is a long-standing doctrine
that U.S. courts should construe a later statute to be consis-
tent with a prior treaty to the greatest extent possible .' This
131. See Breard, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18
(1957); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). For an excellent his-
torical overview of the application of the "later-in-time" rule, see Vagts, supra
note 105, at 313-21.
132. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376.
133. See id.
134. The key cases addressed herein including LaGrand, Breard, Valdez and
Faulder all created friction between the U.S. and friendly governments con-
cerned with the treatment of their nationals in the U.S. criminal justice system.
See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text. The international litigation gen-
erated by LaGrand and Breard are the most striking examples.
135. See Vagts, supra note 105, at 320; Jordan J. Paust, Breard and Treaty-
Based Rights under the Consular Convention, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 691 (1998).
136. See Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U. S. 64, 118 (1804); Chew Heong
v. U.S., 112 U.S. 536 (1884). For a review of recent applications of these cases,
see Vagts, supra note 105, at 322-23.
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doctrine, arising from the landmark case Murray v. The
Charming Betsy, 131 is entirely harmonious with the normative
rank of treaties; that is, that they enjoy full parity with fed-
eral statutes.
138
In addition, to find a subsequent statute inconsistent
with a prior treaty logically should require an indication of
congressional intent to supersede the prior treaty.139 No such
intention is apparent from the AEDPA.4 ° The need for clear
congressional intention to override the treaty is made even
more acute by the terms of the VCCR itself, which require its
successful integration into the domestic law of member coun-
tries."' Specifically, Article 36(2) states that even as the
rights provided for under Article 36(1) are to be exercised in
conformity with the laws of the state applying it, those same
laws must enable the full effect of the purposes of the
treaty.' Therefore, the terms of the treaty itself set the bar
quite high to demonstrate the necessary congressional intent
to supersede those terms by a subsequent statute. This is es-
pecially so where the consequence is to deprive the applicant
of a forum to raise the violation of the treaty.
Finally, when faced with an ICJ order of provisional
measures in the future, state and federal officials will need to
respond more respectfully than they have in the past. The
rather dismissive treatment the ICJ's provisional orders re-
ceived in Breard and LaGrand would be wholly inconsistent
with the new legal landscape. In the case of the federal gov-
ernment, a more proactive approach to help ensure compli-
ance with an order by the ICJ surely will be necessary. Oth-
erwise, the United States risks further exposure before the
ICJ and a loss of credibility in its relations with other coun-
tries. At a minimum, the executive branch of the federal gov-
ernment no longer can sway a court's ruling with a unilateral
interpretation that minimizes orders of provisional measures
as non-binding in international law.
The need for a more sensitive approach to the effects of a
treaty breach is most evident in cases like Breard, LaGrand
137. Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804).
138. See supra notes 105-08.
139. See Paust, supra note 135, at 692-93.
140. Id. at 692.
141. VCCR, supra note 5, at art. 36(2).
142. Id. For the full text of Article 36, see supra text accompanying note 6.
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and Valdez. These cases strain U.S. relations with normally
friendly countries. The issue of compliance with the VCCR is
quite distinct from the debate over the application of the
death penalty in the United States. At the same time, it un-
necessarily contributes to the United States' isolation over
the issue of the death penalty and underscores an inability or
unwillingness to follow through on important obligations of
international law. This is especially apparent considering
that U.S. citizens benefit substantially from the rights pro-
vided by the VCCR.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The LaGrand case, brought by Germany against the
United States, highlights an aspect of international law that
directly affects individuals, not just nation-states. United
States compliance with the consular access and notification
requirements of the VCCR historically has been quite poor.
Notable violations of the treaty, especially in the context of
death penalty cases, have created friction for the United
States on the international plane. In LaGrand, the ICJ thor-
oughly rebuked the United States for failure to abide by the
treaty and ruled that the application of the "procedural de-
fault" rule during post-conviction habeas corpus review in
federal court interfered with the purposes of the treaty.143
Additionally, the ICJ concluded that the United States'
failure to abide by an order of provisional measures to delay
the execution was an independent violation of international
law.' In reaching this conclusion, the ICJ ruled decisively
that its orders of provisional measures constitute binding ob-
ligations in international law.'4' This holding has strong im-
plications for the future jurisprudence of the ICJ.
The United States has undertaken to improve its compli-
ance with the VCCR. The ICJ has mandated that "review
and reconsideration" occur in certain cases where an inmate
is convicted and sentenced following a VCCR violation.'46
While the United States enjoys broad latitude in how this
may be implemented, it would be reasonable to commute a
143. Final Judgment, supra note 1, 90-91.





death sentence pursuant to this requirement.
The mechanisms to achieve effective "review and recon-
sideration" of convictions and sentences are limited by very
substantial legal obstacles in federal law. Similarly, there
are no direct and efficient legal mechanisms in U.S. law to
ensure compliance with ICJ orders of provisional measures.
Nevertheless, the LaGrand case offers a legal platform to ad-
vance these objectives.
Poor U.S. compliance with the VCCR remains one of the
most contentious issues in the death penalty debate.'47 In the
post-September 11, 2001 world, more foreign nationals than
ever will face the death penalty in the U.S. criminal justice
system. Whether the LaGrand case will have a substantial
effect on U.S. law and policy remains to be seen. If the
United States cannot find a way to effectively implement La-
Grand and generally improve its compliance with the VCCR,
it will expose itself to further censure on this issue in the
realm of international affairs. In a time when coalitions and
allies are essential, this would be a heavy and unnecessary
price to pay. The ICJ's LaGrand opinion is an important new
element in the evolving legal landscape of consular notifica-
tion and access. United States' law and policy must also
evolve to meet the challenges and responsibilities of that new
landscape.
147. See Death Penalty Information Center, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (last visited Apr. 14, 2002).
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